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Abstract
Zimbabwean villagers of distinct background have resettled in government-organized land reforms for more than three
decades. Against this backdrop, I assess the level of social cohesion in some of the newly established communities by
estimating the average preferences for fairness in a structural model of bounded rationality. The estimations are based on
behavioral data from an ultimatum game field experiment played by 234 randomly selected households in 6 traditional and
14 resettled villages almost two decades after resettlement. Equal or higher degrees of fairness are estimated in all
resettlement schemes. In one, or arguably two, out of three distinct resettlement schemes studied, the resettled villagers
exhibit significantly higher degrees of fairness (pƒ0:11 ) and rationality (pƒ0:04 ) than those who live in traditional villages.
Overall, villagers appear similarly rational, but the attitude toward fairness is significantly stronger in resettled communities
(pƒ0:01 ). These findings are consistent with the idea of an increased need for cooperation required in recommencement.
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Introduction
The government of Zimbabwe has implemented land reform
schemes to address inequalities in land ownership since gaining
independence in 1980. Numerous Zimbabwean households have
resettled in government-organized land reform programs in the
past, and several resettled people faced the challenge of restarting
along with unfamiliar people. According to Wu et al. [1], studies
show that social distance influences people’s justice concerns [2–5]
and people’s other-regarding behavior [6–8]. A field experiment in
Southern Ethiopia found higher levels of generosity towards
known family members than towards anonymous villagers [9].
The Zimbabwean land reform, therefore, poses the question
whether villagers in new communities lost social capital and, in the
long-run, suffer from an eradication of social ties compared to
villagers who did not resettle. I address this question by studying
the following subquestions: Does social cohesion exist among
former strangers after resettlement in some instances? If so, how
much? And, how to reliably measure social cohesion or an
interpretable factor of it? To answer these questions, I evaluate if
different social preferences are present in some of the communities
of the early Zimbabwean land reform period and their non-
resettled counterparts almost two decades after once unfamiliar
households became neighbors through resettling.
I measure social cohesion roughly by estimating the relative
strengths of self-interest in relation to an interest in fairness,
defined as an aversion toward inequality between one’s own and
another’s well-being. As I have no comparable information on the
fairness preferences of the villagers before resettlement, the
evidence on preference differences put forward in this study does
not allow to infer what was causing them. The estimated
differences in the villagers preferences might either be the result
of resettlement or have been preexisting to resettlement and, thus,
reflect a self-selection of more fair-minded individuals into the land
reform program. Notwithstanding the initial conditions, some of
which are documented by Dekker, Deininger et al. or Kinsey [10–12],
one possible outcome of resettlement could be an erosion of trust
[13] or other factors of social cohesion through the increased social
distance among resettled villagers compared to traditional
villagers. The study at hand suggests that resettlement did not
eradicate social cohesion in resettled villages.
I explore the levels of social cohesion in three resettlement
schemes (Mupfurudzi, Mutanda, Sengezi) of the first period of
Zimbabwean land reform and in geographically close traditional
communities. Data stem from an ultimatum game field experi-
ment preceding this study [13] and were also part of a large-scale
study of cross-cultural variation in behavior [14,15]. The choice
problem given in the ultimatum game was to be solved
anonymously by randomly matched pairs of villagers within 14
resettled and 6 traditional communities. The decision task in the
ultimatum game experiment mimics the common feature of
bargaining situations that different parties have to reach an
agreement to realize a mutually beneficial outcome. The approach
of applying a structural decision model to this field experimental
data in order to disentangle self-interested, fairness and rationality
as competing explanations for the variations in experimental
behavior that were observed across regions and resettlement status
is novel. It has two distinct advantages over the analysis of the
descriptive statistics of the game: Firstly, out-of-sample predictions
become possible as with any estimated model. Secondly, the
equilibrium model applied allows the extrapolation of the
parameters estimated to other settings than the experiment
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because the estimates have a defined interpretation that is
meaningful also outside the experimental context.
A quantal response equilibrium is applied to estimate the
relative strength of fairness in relation to self-interest. It is a game-
theoretic solution concept, which combines an equilibrium notion
that accounts for strategic optimizing behavior with bounded
rationality [16,17]. Players are assumed to make random errors in
choosing which pure strategy to play, but the probability of any
particular strategy being chosen increases in its payoff such that
more costly errors are less likely. The randomness introduced
transforms the deterministic model in a stochastic model that
allows for maximum-likelihood estimation of the model’s param-
eters.
The estimation results indicate significant degrees of fairness
and bounded rationality in addition to self-interest for all of the
three different areas studied. All resettled villagers (pƒ0:01 ),
resettled villagers in the Sengezi area (p~0:00 ) and arguably
resettled villagers in the Mutanda area (pƒ0:11 ) show signifi-
cantly higher degrees of fairness than their traditional village
counterparts. The pooled data of all areas do not reject the
hypothesis that resettled and traditional villagers are, on average,
equally rational. The assumption of common rationality for the
Mutanda and Sengezi areas is rejected (pƒ0:04 ) and significantly
higher degrees of rationality are estimated for their resettled
villagers. A higher degree of fairness and a lower degree of
rationality are estimated for resettled villagers in Mupfurudzi, but
their difference from the preferences and rationality of traditional
villagers is insignificant. The positive correlation between fairness
and rationality in the Sengezi and Mutanda areas is consistent
with the idea that social cohesion accompanies villagers’ experi-
ence in cooperative interaction with unrelated households that,
presumably, occurred more frequently in resettled villages.
This study makes also a methodological contribution. As for the
disaggregated data none of the differences that are estimated
significant in the equilibrium model are significant in the
descriptive statistics of the ultimatum game behavior and vise
versa, my study provides an example for how an equilibrium
assessment of the ultimatum game changes the level of analysis
compared to a non-equilibrium approach.
Land Reform in Zimbabwe
The land policy of the Government of Zimbabwe can be
divided into two periods: A willing-buyer and willing-seller land reform
program existed for two decades from independence to 2000.
Donors assisted the Zimbabwean government to finance the
purchase of land, and the land reform resettled over 70,000
indigenous households on farms previously owned by white
commercial farmers until 1997. The scheme targeted individual
households of displaced people, the landless and those with
insufficient land to sustain themselves and their families. The
beneficiaries were allocated five hectares of arable land for
cultivation in a resettlement site and the remaining area was
devoted to communal grazing land. Households were also
allocated a residential plot within newly planned villages. As the
majority of households resettled on an individual basis, resettled
villagers, unlike traditional villagers, started to live largely among
unrelated households instead of their kin [10,11,18,19]. ‘‘To
qualify for land reform, several categories of potential beneficiaries
were distinguished. Eligible for settlement were: (a) refugees and
other persons displaced by war; (b) those residing in communal
areas who were landless; and (c) those who had insufficient land to
maintain themselves and their families. In addition, to be eligible,
household heads were supposed to be married or widowed, aged
25–55 and not in formal employment. Broadly speaking, these
criteria seem to have been followed. Some 90% of households
settled in the early 1980s had been adversely affected by the war
for independence in some form or another. Before being resettled,
most (66%) had been peasant farmers with most of the remainder
being landless laborers on commercial farms, workers in the rural
informal sector or wage earners in the urban sector’’ [11]. ‘‘But
whatever the reason for resettlement, it is safe to assume that there
were many more households in similar situations who did not
resettle, either because their applications were unsuccessful or
because they found traditional means of accessing land and
dealing with personal trauma more attractive’’ [13].
Studying the benefits and the costs of the willing-buyer and willing-
seller land reform program in Zimbabwe, a positive but modest
economic return, between 5 and 8 percent, on the investment in
land reform was estimated [11]. According to Deininger et al. the
assessment of the performance of the land reform program
depends largely on the perspective taken: Taking a household
perspective, some research indicates that resettled villagers
managed to accumulate large amounts of (livestock) assets or to
increase their productivity tremendously [20,21]. In terms of per
capita performance criteria, such as per capita expenditure or
nutritional status, traditional villagers outperformed resettled
villagers [22,23].
A fast-track land reform that ended the willing-buyer and willing-
seller land reform was begun by President Mugabe in 2000. It
seized white-owned farms and its legality and constitutionality
have been challenged in the Zimbabwean High and Supreme
Courts. On the one hand, the fast-track land reform has been
criticized for its socioeconomic consequences: ‘‘Mr. Mugabe’s
chaotic land redistribution campaign [...] caused an exodus of
white farmers, crippled the economy, and ushered in widespread
shortages of basic commodities’’ [24]. One the other hand, it is
argued that a new rural economy has developed ten years after
large areas of Zimbabwe’s commercial farm land were compul-
sorily transferred without compensation: ‘‘A wide range of
activities contribute to highly differentiated livelihoods in [some
of] the new resettlements’’ [25]. In sum, the fast-track and willing-
buyer-willing-seller land reforms took place in different macroeco-
nomic and political contexts with distinct resettlement practices.
Related Literature
I review two related strands of literature. Firstly, I discuss studies
which argue that social preferences models predict observed
behavior accurately and studies which investigated heterogeneity
in social preferences in distinct sociocultural contexts. These
previous studies motivated my estimation of social preferences in
the two distinct environments created by the Zimbabwean willing-
buyer and willing-seller land reform. Secondly, I review studies that
analyzed the very same data before and discuss what this study
adds. Background information on the early period of Zimbabwean
land reform or attempts to evaluate it are not reviewed, but
provided, for instance, by Dekker, Deininger et al. or Kinsey [10–12].
Previous studies suggests that models of social preferences
reproduce observed behavior consistently when estimated in a
quantal response equilibrium of different experimental games:
Bounded rationality and significant degrees of altruism reproduce
behavior in public goods games [26,27]. Linear or quadratic
fairness and decision error predict the patterns of positive offers
and rejections in, as well as across, bargaining games [28,29].
Hence, social preferences, which capture forms of (conditional)
altruism in addition to self-interest, might be an appropriate model
to explain behavior across games. However, how well can diversity
in the strength of social preferences explain behavior across
individuals and societies? Bellemare et al. used data from ultimatum
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and dictator games played online by a large representative Dutch
population sample to estimate nonlinear preferences for equity
combined with limited rationality. Heterogeneous equality pref-
erences together with subjective expectations predict their
observed decisions well [30]. Barr et al. investigate to what extent
behavioral variations observed in three bargaining games could be
attributed to differences along a single dimension, namely the
value placed on equality. The bargaining games were played in 15
distinct societies, ranging from US undergraduates to Amazonian,
Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Testing a number of
predictions implied by a utility function, which captures the same
notion of quadratic inequality aversion as employed in this study,
they conclude that ‘‘inequality aversion is the principle motivating
factor [in all societies] and variations in behavior across societies
and across individuals within societies do, in large part, result from
differences in the value placed upon equality’’ [31]. Since equality
preferences seem to capture the behavior in bargaining games
well, even across sociocultural contexts, these studies motivated my
choice to estimate a model of quadratic inequality aversion based
on ultimatum game bargaining data in order to measure social
cohesion among the sampled Zimbabwean villagers in the study at
hand.
The same methodology and Zimbabwean ultimatum game data
were used previously. Estimating social preferences on the study
population level, Kohler finds no evidence for gender-related
differences in the Zimbabwean villagers’ preferences, a result that
could be due to the small sample size. However, he finds that
resettlement status significantly impacts the value villagers place on
equality. This finding was robust in a limited test of the model
specification, which suggested that a model of symmetric
inequality aversion fits the aggregate ultimatum game data better
than a model of aversion merely to disadvantageous situations.
The earlier study also compared estimates from ultimatum games
played in small-scale societies and industrialized countries, and it
argues that higher levels of decision error are estimated for small-
scale societies even when correcting for the different purchasing
power of the money at stake in the games [32]. In the present
analyses, I employ Kohler’s model specification with symmetric
inequality aversion that fitted the data better to trace the difference
in social preferences observed after resettlement on the regional
level.
The data, which I reanalyze on a more disaggregate level, has
been collected by Barr who first evaluated the ultimatum game
(UG) data and additional trust game data to make a behavioral
comparison between the two groups of villages. She found that
game behavior was consistent with, firstly, there being no
differences in socially transmitted behavioral rules and, secondly,
the hypothesis of similar altruism or loyalty towards co-villagers in
both village groups. Thirdly, Barr describes her data as consistent
with the hypothesis that resettled villagers behave more cautiously
when in strategic situations with their co-villagers [13]. Due to
optimizing behavior, in the form of strategic anticipation of the
other’s incentives, and the abstract experimental context, it is,
however, in question how to interpret the differences detected in
the descriptive statistics of the UG behavior and how to learn from
these differences beyond the context of the game? Higher
proposals in the UG may not only result from social cohesion or
fairness considerations. In particular, also greater uncertainty
about the responder’s rejection behavior may cause self-interested
precautionary high proposals. In the study at hand, I resolve these
issues by linking the behavior that is observed in the UG to
underlying incentives and the degree of rationality of the
experiment participants, which are then compared, rather than
observed action. Moreover, the quantal response equilibrium
model of social preferences can be adapted to other game-
theoretic problems. Thus, unlike the UG raw data, it can be used
to obtain a plausible forecast of behavior in other contexts than the
UG, after its parameters are estimated.
Materials and Methods
Data
Data were generated by Barr who conducted an UG field
experiment in Zimbabwe in 1999 [13]. Her sample covers 234
households, i.e., 117 matched pairs of UG bargainers, in 14 newly
established villages and six traditional communities nearby
geographically. The sampled villages were all among the first
resettled villages created in 1982, within three resettlement
schemes. The Mupfurudzi and Sengezi resettlement schemes are
each compared to the two traditional villages in the adjacent areas
that provided most settlers to the resettled villages in the sample
(see [10,19]). The households from which the players in each of the
subject pools originated were participants in a long-term
monitoring exercise. It was designed to assess the effects of
resettlement in Zimbabwe. The samples of subjects for the
experiments matched the sample of households in the monitoring
exercise to the extent possible. In some villages both UGs and trust
games were played. In other villages only one game selected at
random was played [13]. The geographical location of the
research sites is mapped in Dekker or Deininger et al. [10,11].
Resettlement villages differed from traditional villages in a
number of ways around the time of the field experiment (Table 1).
Household size, the proportions of aged people, livestock wealth,
and within-village kinship ties varied significantly between
resettled and traditional households (pƒ0:1 ). Some of these
variables, along with other variables, varied significantly between
resettled and traditional villages, even within the three areas [19].
Each resettlement scheme’s area represents one of Zimbabwe’s
three agriculturally most important agroclimatic zones that
correspond to regions of moderately high, moderate and restricted
agricultural potential: Mupfurudzi in Mashonaland Central
Province, Mutanda in Manicaland Province and Sengezi in
Mashonaland East Province [18]. While the traditional villages
exist since the 1940s and 1950s, the inhabitants’ ancestors lived
together before, giving the social structure a longer tradition that
differs from the resettled communities [10,33]. Within villages,
participants for the UG experiment were recruited by inviting
each household to send a member above the age of 14. The
headman was asked to oversee that between forty and sixty
percent of the volunteers were women. Play in the games was
anonymous, non-recurring and for stakes between a half and two
day’s local casual labor wage. The stakes in the administered UG
were Zim$ 50 and the smallest unit to be offered was Zim$ 5.
Since the subject pool was small and experimentees knew they
were playing with someone from their village, observed play was
seen to be likely to reflect experiences from the day-to-day
communal interaction [13]. The proportion of households
sampled in the experiments varied between 0.31 and 0.59 or
was 1. Average earnings were between half a day’s and a day’s
casual wage. The exchange rate at the time of the experiment was
Zim$ 37.95 per US$ 1.
The UG itself is a strategic situation, in which two players are
allotted a sum of money (the stakes) and then bargain about its
division. The first player, called the proposer, makes an offer,
which the second player, the responder, can accept or reject. If the
responder accepts then the stakes are divided according to the
proposed split. If the responder rejects, both receive nothing.
Subgame perfect equilibrium and own money maximization
Fair Play in an Ultimatum Game after Resettlement
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 May 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 5 | e64791
predict that proposers should offer the smallest non-zero amount
and responders should always accept because they face a choice
between zero and something. In contrast, as observed in numerous
prior UG experiments (e.g. [34]), the behavior within the UG
experiments in all Zimbabwean villages substantially deviated
from narrow self-interest: Firstly, offers are positive, averaging 38
to 48 percent of the stakes, and the unique mode for all but
Mupfurudzi’s traditional proposers is fair division. Secondly, offers
below 30 percent of the stakes were rejected by 33 to 57 percent of
responders in all but Sengezi’s traditional villages, in which 17
percent of the responders rejects such low offers (Table 2, rows 1–
4).
Comparing the behavior of traditional and resettled villagers
(Table 2, rows 5–12) shows that mean offers in villages of the three
resettlement schemes are between 45 and 48 percent compared to
38 to 43 percent in traditional communities nearby geographically.
While all average offers are larger in resettled villages, a two-sided
t-test indicates that the difference is significant only in the pooled
and in the Sengezi sample at the 5 and 10 percent level,
respectively. A Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon test further indicates a
Table 1. Comparison of household demographics, wealth, within-village linkages, and village ethnic composition in resettled and
traditional areas.
Resettled villages Traditional villages Range of village means
In the years 1999 to 2001 N MN N MN Resettled Traditional
Nonreligious memberships 557 4.09 143 1.52* 1.00–7.50 0.78–3.14
Household size 394 9.39 143 5.9* 5.73–14.20 5.00–6.88
Women 15-60 y 394 0.28 143 0.27 0.20–0.34 0.20–0.32
Young ,15 y 394 0.4 143 0.41 0.33–0.50 0.42–0.46
Aged .60 y 394 0.08 143 0.11* 0.03–0.12 0.06–0.20
Livestock 568 13.59 145 7.71* 7.29–25.15 6.35–7.47
Marriage ties 753 0.81 188 0.91 0.06–1.87 0.53–1.86
Extended family ties 753 5.76 188 0.55* 0.00–1.56 1.42–10.81
Nuclear family ties 753 0.3 188 1.91* 0.00–0.68 0.82–2.83
Some initial social capital 723 0.83 245 1* 0.42–1.00 1.00–1.00
Ethnic dominance 22 40.77 6 49.67 0.19–1.00 0.32–0.70
Ethnic diversity 22 5.95 6 5.33 1.00–11.00 4.00–6.00
Number of households 22 37 6 46.17* 13.00–64.00 34.00–63.00
Adopted from Barr who provides the variable definitions and assumes that close and extended family ties predate resettlement and so can count as a special type of
initial condition. Some initial social capital reflects the proportion of households that knew any other households prior to resettlement who resettled nearby; it is set
equal to 1 for traditional villages. Data sources: Barr, Dekker and Kinsey [10,13,40].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064791.t001
Table 2. Summary of ultimatum game bargaining experiment.
All Mupfurudzi Mutanda Sengezi
Villagers Action N MN SD N MN SD N MN SD N MN SD
All Offer 117 0.44 0.11a 34 0.44 0.11b 19 0.45 0.10 64 0.44 0.12
Rejection rate 117 0.08 0.27 34 0.06 0.24 19 0.05 0.23 64 0.09 0.29
… if offer,0.5 38 0.24 0.43c 12 0.17 0.39 5 0.20 0.45 21 0.29 0.46
… if offer,0.3 13 0.46 0.52d 3 0.33 0.58e 2 0.50 0.71 8 0.50 0.54
Resettled Offer 86 0.45 0.10 25 0.46 0.08 9 0.48 0.04 52 0.45 0.12
Rejection rate 86 0.07 0.26 25 0.04 0.20 9 0.00 0.00 52 0.10 0.30
… if offer,0.5 24 0.25 0.44 7 0.14 0.38 2 0.00 0.00 15 0.33 0.49
… if offer,0.3 7 0.57 0.54 1 1.00 0 6 0.50 0.55
Traditional Offer 31 0.41 0.14 9 0.38 0.17 10 0.43 0.13 12 0.41 0.13
Rejection rate 31 0.10 0.30 9 0.11 0.33 10 0.10 0.32 12 0.08 0.29
… if offer,0.5 14 0.21 0.43 5 0.20 0.45 3 0.33 0.58 6 0.17 0.41
… if offer,0.3 6 0.33 0.52 2 0.00 0.00 2 0.50 0.71 2 0.50 0.71
Superscripts denote significant differences in the mean UG behaviors of resettled and traditional villagers in the area. aT-test and Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon test for the
equality of mean offers (p#0.05). bT-test for the equality of mean offers (p#0.10). cChi-square test for the equality of the rejected proportions of offers smaller than half
(p#0.10). dFisher’s exact test for the equality of the rejected proportions of offers smaller than 30 percent (p#0.10). eFisher’s exact test for the equality of the rejected
proportions of offers smaller than 30 percent (p= 0.16). Data source: Barr [13].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064791.t002
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difference in the overall offer distribution at the 5 percent level.
Chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests show no statistical evidence for
difference in the overall rejection rate of the offers observed, but
for differences in the average rejection rate of low offers below 50
and 30 percent in the pooled sample as well as for the rejection
rate of offers below 30 percent in Sengezi at the 10 and 16 percent
level, respectively. An equal partition of the money at stake is
proposed most frequently in 69 and 55 percent of all play in
resettled and traditional villages, respectively. The most generous
offer of 60 percent of the stakes is observed three times in two
resettled villages in the Mupfurudzi area.
Model
Positive average offers and rejection of small proposals in the
UG resemble typical experimental behavior that has been studied
extensively. This behavioral pattern is predicted, for instance, by
social preferences which assume that players care about fairness in
addition to self-interest [7,11,25]. Such social preferences trigger
positive offers in the UG through inequality averse enough
responders R, who reject small offers. Independently of the
triggered positive offers, non-zero offers will also be made by
proposers P who are themselves substantially inequality averse.
Adopting the functional representation of concern for fairness
proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels [7], I estimate the coefficient of a
quadratic loss function by which deviations from payoff equity
diminish the utility gained from one’s own payoff:
ui(xi,x{i)~
c vi{
b
2
vi{
1
2
 2 !
if xi,x{i=0
0 if xi,x{i~0
8><
>:
Surplus c~xizx{i is the sum of individual payoffs and vi~
xi
c
is the proportion of the surplus that the player i[ P,Rf g gets.
Parameter b measures the importance of relative gains in
comparison to one’s own monetary payoff. It is interpreted as
fairness and assumed common to a population. For bw0 , all
things being equal, utility decreases if there is an inequality in
payoffs, regardless whether it is to a player’s advantage or
disadvantage. This effect is the stronger, the larger an inequality is.
In the UG, such utility implies that the responder rejects unequal
proposals if bw2vR vR{0:5ð Þ{2 . The proposer, intrinsically or
together with anticipation of a fair-minded responder’s rejection of
small or large offers, may offer higher amounts than implied by
pure self-interest. As the degree of fairness b co-determines
behavior in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the UG, variations
therein give a rationale for the varying degree of sharing behavior
observed between resettled and traditional villagers in the
Zimbabwean UG field experiment.
An anticipated random shock shall add to the expected utility
and cause players to not always choose their best strategy given
their beliefs in order to capture variation in the optimal play of
individuals who share one and the same preferences. Each player
knows that the other player does so as well and anticipates the
preferences and decision error of the other. As a consequence, all
strategies of a player can be observed with some probability. The
equilibrium for a given error structure is defined as a fixed point of
this process with mutual correct anticipation. McKelvey and Palfrey
established the existence of this quantal response equilibrium
(QRE) under the assumptions that players maximize utility and
estimate expected payoffs in an unbiased way [16,17]. The
original QRE is based on a game’s normal-form, which disregards
that, in the UG, the responder can make his choice between
accepting and rejecting the offer after observing the offer [16]. The
QRE was extended to extensive-form games later by proposing an
agent QRE. The agent QRE is defined similarly to the normal-
form QRE, but for the agent normal-form of an extensive-form
game, in which different information sets of a given player are
assumed to be played independently by different agents who share
the same payoff function [17]. This study applies the agent QRE.
In the UG played in the Zimbabwean villages, the proposer P
chooses a strategy s[SP in his discrete strategy set
SP~ 0,0:1,0:2,:::,1f g of eleven possible offers, in which the stakes
of Zim$ 50 are normalized to one. The portion s denotes how
much the proposer offers to the responder R and 1{sð Þ is what he
would like to keep for himself. The behavioral strategy r sð Þ[SR of
the responder is a function that maps each possible offer into his
dichotomous strategy set SR~ Accept,Rejectf g . Assuming the
best response functions follow a logit distribution, the resulting
QRE is often called a logit equilibrium, in which the players’
optimal mixed strategies are determined by the pair of probabil-
ities that solve:
pR sð Þ~ exp lu(s,1{s)ð Þ
1z exp lu(s,1{s)ð Þ and
pP sð Þ~ exp lpR sð Þu(1{s,s)ð ÞP
~s[SP
exp lpR ~sð Þu(1{~s,~s)ð Þ
The numerators are exponential functions of the expected
payoffs that result from the UG behavior. The denominators are
normalizing factors that force the probabilities to sum to one. The
distribution parameter l is a common measure of rationality,
which implies that each strategy is chosen with equal probability if
l?0 and that the expected utility maximizing strategy is chosen
with certainty if l?? . As surplus c and the degree of rationality l
are interchangeable in the logit response functions pR sð Þ and
pP sð Þ, the size of surplus affects the estimated degree of rationality.
All estimates reported for l are based on c~ Zim$ 50.
The logit response functions pP sð Þ and pR sð Þ also define the
logit equilibrium for the UG. They imply that strategies with
higher expected payoffs are chosen with higher probability. The
logit equilibrium approaches a subset of Nash equilibria as
rationality increases, i.e. decision errors decrease [16,38]. Since
the random utility shocks in the model cause differently
experienced utility at identical behavior, one interpretation of
the QRE framework is that it represents heterogeneity between
individuals, which is not covered by the preference parameter b.
The intuition of QRE solution and its application to the UG in
more detail is discussed elsewhere (e.g. [32]).
Estimation
The stochastic equilibrium prediction of the logit equilibrium, in
contrast to the deterministic Nash equilibrium, allows to obtain
maximum likelihood estimates of the strength of fairness b relative
to self-interest and the degree of rationality l . As the joint density
of k[ 1,:::,Kf g independent and identically distributed observa-
tions is given by multiplying the probabilities to observe each
individual outcome, the log-likelihood of observing a particular
sample of k observations in the UG is given by:
lnL lð Þ~
X
k
dk ln pP sð Þ:pR sð Þ½ z
X
k
1{dkð Þ ln pP sð Þ:(1{pR sð Þ)½ 
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Dummy dk assumes unity for acceptance and naught for
rejection of s. The identification of parameters b and l in the
likelihood function is warranted through the functional form of the
employed utility function. The degree of rationality l is affected
proportionally and inequality aversion b disproportionately high
by payoff variations.
Results and Discussion
Model Fit
Figures 1, 2, 3, 4 show the observed and predicted play in
resettled and traditional villages, overall and for each sample area.
All curves of the predicted behavior (solid lines) show that the
model resembles the observed high frequency (dashed lines) of
mid-range offers along with higher rejection rates of low offers for
the resettled villagers and universal decline in rejection rates for
offers smaller than half. Higher degrees of rationality are reflected
by a smaller spread of the offer distribution. Pronounced interest
in fairness causes an incline in the forecast rejection rate for offers
smaller or larger than half, but offers larger than 60 percent are
not observed. Table 3 presents the distribution of observed and
predicted offers by area and resettlement status. The correspond-
ing Table 4 summarizes the actual and forecast rejection rates.
The model with one and the same estimates for resettled and
traditional villagers is reported for the Mupfurudzi area as it will
later not be rejected by the data.
The estimated model correctly predicts the unique mode of
equal division in the UG in all areas but Mupfurudzi and
substantial low offer rejection. The forecast and actual proposer
behavior for all data result in weighted correlation coefficients of
0.73 (resettled) and 0.78 (traditional); the forecast and actual
responder behavior result in correlation coefficients of 0.91
(resettled) and 0.64 (traditional). Comparing the decisions of
proposers and responders in Mupfurudzi, Mutanda and Sengezi
with predicted behavior generally indicates a good fit of the model
estimated by area. The forecast and actual responder behavior
result in significant correlation coefficients of 0.65 to 1 in all areas
but Sengezi. For traditional Sengezi responders the model over-
predicts the low offer rejection probability of the two rejected
lowest offers and fails to capture its peak of 33 percent rejections at
offers of 40 percent, leading to an insignificant negative correlation
of –0.24 between observation and prediction. However, a single
rejection of the two lowest offers instead of certain acceptance in
the traditional Sengezi communities would result in a significant
positive correlation between actual and forecast behavior. If the
negative correlation was true, it could point to a failure in the
model’s structure. The model that imposes one and the same
preferences on proposers and responders may, for instance, not
represent the decision-making of responders in Sengezi. Due to the
few available observations this assumption is not tested, but I argue
for its plausibility because villagers were assigned to a role in the
UG randomly. If the UG itself does not affect the inert
preferences, then there is no reason to expect systematic
differences between proposers and responders. In fact, the model
fits the other data well. Hence, imposing the same preference
structure for proposers and responders in Sengezi can be a
safeguard against data mining in a single subsample.
Parameter Estimates
The model is fitted to the data in the quantal response
equilibrium of the sequential UG assuming the villagers’ choices
were mutual best responses, given their own and anticipating the
other’s preferences and degree of rationality. The estimated degree
of fairness measures the extent to which observed offers and
rejections are explained by fairness felt toward others, taking into
account the occurrence of decision error and rejection of low
offers. Based on having assumed an appropriate model structure,
the estimated model parameters, therefore, reflect the extent to
which rejections were made because of a violation of an intrinsic
fairness norm or because of decision errors. The estimated
decision error is part of the model and does not reflect the model
fit of the data.
Table 5 summarizes the parameter estimates of three different
model specifications by resettlement status. The full sample
consists of 117 pairs of observations. The estimation results are
firstly presented for the full sample (Table 5, rows 1–3) and then by
area (Table 5, rows 4–12). The table reports the estimation results
for the unrestricted Model 1, in which fairness and rationality may
vary across the resettlement status; the restricted Model 2, in
Figure 1. Observed and predicted offer distributions and rejection rates in all areas. Dashed lines indicate actual play. Solid lines indicate
model prediction. Blue lines and upward-pointing triangle indicate resettled villages. Red lines and downward-pointing triangle indicate traditional
villages. Data source: Barr [13].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064791.g001
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which solely rationality may vary across the resettlement status;
and the restricted Model 3, in which solely fairness may vary
across resettlement status. A restricted model (not reported), in
which rationality may vary across the resettlement status, whereas
pure self-interest is assumed, is universally rejected in favor of a
reported model by likelihood-ratio tests. Standard errors are
bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions. The p-values (not reported)
corresponding to models reported in Table 5 indicate that the
estimates of each model, but two traditional Sengezi specifications,
are significant at the 1 percent level. This confirms the
presumption that decision errors and fairness are both necessary
to explain the variation in play well in the majority of cases. No
interest in fairness may prevail in traditional Sengezi villages if
fairness was estimated only within this subsample (Table 5, Models
1 and 3, row 12; p§0:15 ).
Model 1 shows that, overall, positive degrees of fairness and
rationality are estimated (Table 5, row 1). Splitting the sample
according to resettlement status, I find a significantly higher degree
of fairness in resettled than in traditional villages (13.97 vs. 4.39).
At the same time the degree of rationality is of similar magnitude
(6.83 vs. 5.74) without significant difference such that, overall, a
model of different fairness (14.04 vs. 3.80), but similar rationality
(6.55) is accepted by the data (Table 5, rows 2–3). Table 6 reports
the corresponding likelihood-ratio tests that reject the equality of
both coefficients between resettled and traditional villagers, jointly
and individually (Table 6, rows 1–3; pƒ0:04 ), but not an equal
degree of rationality after different degrees of fairness were
estimated (Table 6, row 5; p~0:30 ). By contrast, an equal degree
of fairness is rejected after different degrees of rationality were
estimated (Table 6, row 4; p~0:01 ).
Figure 2. Observed and predicted offer distributions and rejection rates in Mupfurudzi. Dashed lines indicate actual play. Solid lines
indicate model prediction. Blue lines and upward-pointing triangle indicate resettled villages. Red lines and downward-pointing triangle indicate
traditional villages. Data source: Barr [13].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064791.g002
Figure 3. Observed and predicted offer distributions and rejection rates in Mutanda. Dashed lines indicate actual play. Solid lines indicate
model prediction. Blue lines and upward-pointing triangle indicate resettled villages. Red lines and downward-pointing triangle indicate traditional
villages. Data source: Barr [13].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064791.g003
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In the Mutanda and Sengezi resettlement schemes, the higher
degree of fairness occurs jointly with a higher degree of rationality.
This finding supports the idea that resettled villagers not only had
an increased need of cooperativeness after their recommencement
but also gained experience in cooperating in the past, which, in
turn, is facilitated by their higher fairness preferences. When the
model is estimated with all data, the data of villagers from three
different resettlement schemes are pooled. The resulting estimates
indicate a higher degree of fairness for resettled villagers, but a
similar degree of rationality for all villagers. That is consistent with
the intuition that the decision error estimates which capture the
heterogeneity between individuals not covered by the social
preference parameter converge in a larger sample, whereas the
increased need for cooperation in recommencement remains an
experience shared only by resettled villagers.
Limitations
The findings discussed are subject to limitations. Preferences
were not estimated on the individual, but on the area and
resettlement status level. Decision error is the way the model
accounts for heterogeneity between individuals. The assumed
structural form of the model was only tested against one
alternative, an asymmetric specification of inequality aversion
(see [32]). The model remains motivated by its success to predict
this and other behavioral data. The analyses are based on a small
data sample from an UG experiment in the field with 117 pairs of
observations and little variation in the observed behavior. Sixty-
five percent of the proposing players offer half, 92 percent of the
responding players accept. These limiting factors are exacerbated
within the three regional subgroup analyses of the impact of
resettlement on the preferences. In spite of these limitations, a
coherent picture emerged: Average fairness is estimated higher for
resettled than for traditional villages in each area. The difference is
significant in Sengezi and arguably Mutanda, but insignificant in
the Mupfurudzi area. Significantly higher fairness estimates are
accompanied by significantly lower decision errors, potentially
reflecting more experience with cooperation amongst the resettled
villagers. None of the findings should be causally attributed to
resettlement without further information because the villagers’
choice to resettle may have been correlated with their fairness
attitudes and rationality. If the more (less) fair-minded self-selected
themselves in the resettlement program, then the reported fairness
estimates would overestimate (underestimate) the effect of reset-
tlement on equality preferences. Even though voluntary partici-
pation in the resettlement program may seem to suggest that non
self-interested motives were at work, the formal eligibility criteria
of being a refugee or displaced, landless or without sufficient land
are also compatible with a purely self-interested motivation to
volunteer for the resettlement program which allocated land to its
beneficiaries. I do not account for either form of selection into the
resettlement program.
Conclusions
I reexamined preexisting experimental data from ultimatum
games conducted in the aftermath of the Zimbabwean 1980s
willing-buyer and willing-seller land reform. A structural model
attributed observed ultimatum game behavior to its potential
Table 6. Summary of hypotheses and tests.
Hypothesis
Number of
parameters –ln L
Area H0 H1 H0 H1 df H0 H1 LR P-value
All br=bt ^ lr=lt br?bt ^ lr?lt 2 4 2 210.07 203.99 12.16 0.00
br=bt ^ lr=lt br=bt ^ lr?lt 2 3 1 210.07 207.87 4.40 0.04
br=bt ^ lr=lt br?bt ^ lr= lt 2 3 1 210.07 204.53 11.07 0.00
br=bt ^ lr?lt br?bt ^ lr?lt 3 4 1 207.87 203.99 7.76 0.01
br?bt ^ lr= lt br?bt ^ lr?lt 3 4 1 204.53 203.99 1.09 0.30
Mupfurudzi br=bt ^ lr=lt br?bt ^ lr?lt 2 4 2 118.00 117.96 0.09 0.96
br=bt ^ lr=lt br=bt ^ lr?lt 2 3 1 118.00 117.98 0.06 0.81
br=bt ^ lr=lt br?bt ^ lr= lt 2 3 1 118.00 117.99 0.02 0.88
br=bt ^ lr?lt br?bt ^ lr?lt 3 4 1 117.98 117.96 0.03 0.86
br?bt ^ lr= lt br?bt ^ lr?lt 3 4 1 117.99 117.96 0.07 0.80
Mut. br=bt ^ lr=lt br?bt ^ lr?lt 2 4 2 28.84 23.62 10.43 0.01
br=bt ^ lr=lt br=bt ^ lr?lt 2 3 1 28.84 24.88 7.90 0.00
br=bt ^ lr=lt br?bt ^ lr= lt 2 3 1 28.84 26.16 5.36 0.02
br=bt ^ lr?lt br?bt ^ lr?lt 3 4 1 24.88 23.62 2.52 0.11
br?bt ^ lr= lt br?bt ^ lr?lt 3 4 1 26.16 23.62 5.07 0.02
Sengezi br=bt ^ lr=lt br?bt ^ lr?lt 2 4 2 61.79 50.89 21.79 0.00
br=bt ^ lr=lt br=bt ^ lr?lt 2 3 1 61.79 55.87 11.83 0.00
br=bt ^ lr=lt br?bt ^ lr= lt 2 3 1 61.79 53.06 17.46 0.00
br=bt ^ lr?lt br?bt ^ lr?lt 3 4 1 55.87 50.89 9.97 0.00
br?bt ^ lr= lt br?bt ^ lr?lt 3 4 1 53.06 50.89 4.34 0.04
df denotes degrees of freedom. ln L denotes the log-likelihood of the fitted model. LR denotes the likelihood-ratio test statistic. P-values stem from a Chi-squared
distribution. r,t indicate that estimate depends on resettlement status. Data source: Barr [13].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064791.t006
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origins. Based on the experimental behavior of 234 resettled and
traditional villagers, I estimated social preferences on the
community level that incorporate a utility loss when the
bargaining villagers obtain other than a fair division of the money
at stake in the game. The strength of the utility loss in comparison
to self-interest was interpreted as concern for fairness, the assumed
proxy for social cohesion. The quantal response equilibrium model
used to estimate villagers’ average concern for fairness introduced
a notion of bounded rationality that assumes players make similar
decision errors, which are negatively related to the payoff from
that decision. Decision error could be interpreted as an estimate of
heterogeneity in fairness between individuals. In the equilibrium,
the players were assumed to maximize utility and correctly
anticipate subsequent behavior. The estimates of fairness and
decision error were obtained by maximizing the likelihood of
observing the experimental behavior.
Significantly positive degrees of fairness and bounded rationality
forecast bargaining behavior accurately for most participants of
the experiments in resettled and traditional villages of the
Mupfurudzi, Mutanda and Sengezi areas. The correlations of
observed and predicted behavior are between 0.45 and 1. In the
supraregional estimations of the model, the aggregate data do not
reject the hypothesis that the observed differences in bargaining
behavior are explained by a higher degree of fairness in resettled
communities alone. Moreover, the data reject all model specifi-
cations that assume similar fairness in favor of specifications that
estimate higher fairness in resettled villages (pƒ0:01 ). In the
regional estimations of the model, higher fairness is also estimated
for resettled villagers within each area, but the difference in the
estimates of resettled and traditional villagers is small and
insignificant for all compared model specifications in Mupfurudzi
(p§0:80 ). In contrast, the homogeneity of resettled and
traditional villagers is rejected in favor of models that assumes
higher average degrees of fairness and/or rationality in the
resettled communities of Mutanda (pƒ0:11 ) and Sengezi
(pƒ0:04 ). The exact p-values depend on the model specifications
compared. In Mutanda, for instance, the estimated fairness
difference is significant at the 1 and 2 percent levels if rationality
is assumed not to vary across resettlement status in the null
hypothesis; it is significant at the 11 percent level if rationality is
assumed to vary across resettlement status in the null hypothesis.
In fact, to avoid sequential testing, for which the test-statistics do
not account, it is necessary to depict only one model specification
as the null hypothesis.
Throughout, I offered three model choices for the null
hypothesis: no fairness and rationality difference; no fairness
difference, but rationality difference; and fairness difference, but
no rationality difference. If tests of the same alternative model that
are based on different null hypotheses point in the same direction,
then the ex ante decision for the null hypothesis is not necessary to
arrive at the same conclusion, and the results are more robust.
This is the case for Mupfurudzi and Sengezi. As Mutanda is the
smallest subsample with 38 villagers, tests for this area may be less
powerful than tests in the larger subsamples of Sengezi with 128
villagers or Mupfurudzi with 68 villagers. Thus, I suggest to
interpret the overall test results in Mutanda as evidence for higher
fairness among its resettled villagers. The fewer decision errors
made by resettled villagers in Sengezi and Mutanda may reflect an
increased experience in cooperating with a randomly matched co-
villager acquired in the past, which in turn is promoted by the
more pronounced fairness preferences.
Against the backdrop of the different regional estimation results,
I found one of various differences across resettlement schemes of
particular interest. Tribal trust lands and protected villages where
the homes to 73, 84 and 91 percent of the settlers in Mupfurudzi,
Sengezi and Mutanda, respectively. However, only 10 percent of
the resettled villagers in Mupfurudzi lived in tribal trust lands
compared to 83 percent in Sengezi and 87 percent in Mutanda
(p~0:02 ) [10].
To conclude, the equal or higher degrees of fairness estimated
from ultimatum game behavior for resettled villagers represent an
equal or stronger interdependence of their well-being. This finding
indicates that social cohesion amongst randomly teamed villagers
is likely to be present in the new communities to a comparable or
higher degree than in traditional communities. As a higher degree
of interest in equal performance is less likely to be overruled by
self-interest, it gives cause for more stable cooperation, for
instance, in public goods provision arguably much needed to
successfully manage a new start. The ability to cooperate can be
conducive to economics success, regardless of whether it was
inherited or brought about by resettlement.
As the new communities are likely to have achieved an
equilibrium of their social development almost two decades after
resettlement, finding positive degrees of fairness in the resettled
villages suggest that the Zimbabwean willing-buyer and willing-seller
land reform has not eradicated social cohesion, irrespective of
whether settlers were more or less fair-minded from the outset. In
a complementary analysis of social consequences of the Zimbab-
wean land reform, Barr studied Trust Game behavior in the same
resettlement schemes. Assessing data and stylized facts, she
suggested that altruistic motivations matter less while motivations
relating to a desire to community-built matter more in resettled
communities [39]. This conjecture is supported by the estimated
fairness attitudes put forward in this study, because fairness
concerns, a form of conditional altruism, provide one plausible
explanation for cooperativeness. This positive view on the social
cohesion in resettlement communities is against the backdrop that,
according to Kinsey, the early years were a Golden Age for the
Zimbabwean land reform program, in which beneficiaries
received exceptional levels of supporting services [12].
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